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ILLINOIS v. GATES: PROBABLE CAUSE
REDEFINED?
JAMES

W. REILLEY,* BARRY E. WrruN**
CHRISTINE P. CURRAN***
INTRODUCTION

In Illinois v. Gates,' the United States Supreme Court abandoned the two-prong test of Aguilar v. Texas 2 and Spinelli v.
United States3 as the sole criterion for determining whether information received from an anonymous tipster amounted to
probable cause to issue a search warrant. In lieu of this socalled "rigid"4 approach, the Court adopted a "totality of the circumstances" analysis.5 In so doing, the Court retained the Aguilar-Spinelli factors as "relevant considerations" in assessing the
viability of an affidavit in support of a search warrant, but failed
to supply any further guidance as to what constitutes probable
6
cause in anonymous tip cases.
This article will explore the evolution of hearsay information as a basis for probable cause to search and will discuss
Gates in light of prior law. Additionally, the issue of whether a
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule should be
adopted will also be considered. The article will conclude with a
discussion of the potential impact of Gates in both the federal
and state systems.
THE EVOLUTION OF HEARSAY AS IT RELATES TO PROBABLE
CAUSE

The notion that hearsay supplied by an informant might
amount to probable cause to arrest and search originated in
* James W. Reilley; J.D., The John Marshall Law School, 1969; B.S.,
Loyola University, 1965.
** Barry E. Witlin; J.D., Loyola University College of Law, 1978; B.S.
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1975.
*** Christine P. Curran; J.D., The John Marshall Law School, 1983; B.S.,
University of Illinois at Chicago, 1977.

1. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
2. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
3. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
4. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2329 (1983).

5. Id. at 2328.
6. Id. at 2329.
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Draperv. United States.7 In Draper,a previously used and reliable tipster supplied a federal agent with very precise information that the defendant was involved in drug sales. 8 The agent
then conducted a surveillance which proved that this information was accurate. 9 The United States Supreme Court held that
the specific and exact information supplied by the previously reliable informant, even though hearsay, provided ample probable
0
cause for the warrantless arrest and search.'
After Draper, the Court decided Jones v. United States"
and for the first time concluded that an affidavit predicated on
hearsay could support a search warrant. 12 The Jones Court concluded that certain statements,1 3 coupled with police corroba7. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). In Draper,the informant, Hereford, told a federal drug agent, Agent Marsh, that Draper had recently taken up a stated address in Denver. Herford told Marsh that Draper
was selling drugs to several addicts in the Denver area. Some four days
later, Hereford told Marsh that Draper had gone to Chicago the day before,
by train and that he would return by train with three ounces of heroin on
either September 8 or 9,1958. Hereford described Draper to Agent Marsh as
being a male Negro of light brown complexion, 27 years old, 5 feet eight
inches tall, 160 pounds, and that he was wearing a light-colored raincoat,
brown slacks and black shoes. Hereford also told Marsh that Draper would
be carrying a tan zippered bag and habitually walked at a fast pace. On
September 9, Agent Marsh was at the Denver Union Station and saw a person with the exact physical attributes and wearing the precise clothing described by the informant alight from an incoming train from Chicago.
Marsh watched this person, Draper, walking quickly and carrying a tan zippered bag, all in accordance with the information supplied by Hereford. In
Draper,the question before the Court was whether all the facts and circumstances gave Agent Marsh "probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest
of Draper and search his person incident to the arrest." Id. at 309-11.
8. Id. at 309.
9. Id. at 309-10.
10. Id. at 312-13.
11. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In Jones, the court reversed a federal drug conviction on the question of whether Jones was unreasonably denied the opportunity to seek suppression. The Court held in the affirmative, invoking
the "automatic standing" rule in favor of one charged with a possessory offense, and accordingly vacated the conviction. However, the Court did proceed to examine the affidavit for a search warrant. Id. at 267-69.
12. 362 U.S. at 271.
13. 362 U.S. at 269. The defendant in Jones cited Nathanson v. United
States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933), which held that an affidavit which merely states
there is cause to search, without providing the facts upon which such belief
is based, was insufficient to establish probable cause. Didone, the affiant,
stated that he had received information that the defendant and another
were involved in the sale of illegal drugs and kept a supply of heroin on
hand in their apartment. He also swore that the informant claimed to have
purchased drugs from the defendant on many occasions, most recently the
day before the warrant was sought. Didone stated that the informant had
given reliable information on many previous occasions and that other
sources substantiated the information. It was on this basis that Didone
founded his belief that illegal drugs were secreted in the defendant's apartment. The Jones Court distinguished Nathanson on the following basis:
' The question here is whether an affidavit which sets out personal observa-
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tion and the fact that the defendant was known to the police as a
drug user, constituted a "substantial basis for crediting the
14
hearsay."'
After Jones and Draper,there was little question that hearsay could provide probable cause for both a warrantless arrest
and an affidavit to support a search warrant, so long as there was
a substantial basis for believing that the hearsay was credible.
Subsequent case law served to refine what, exactly, constituted
a "substantial basis."
The Two-Pronged Analysis of Aguilar and Spinelli
The criteria for determining the sufficiency of affidavits for
search warrants based on hearsay information developed into a
two-fold test in Aguilar v. Texas 1 and Spinelli v. United
States.16 For six years these oft-cited cases occuppied the attention of legal practitioners and commentators alike. In Aguilar,
the affidavit submitted in the application for a search warrant
provided in relevant part:
Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person
and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for 17
the purpose of sale and use contrary to the
provisions of the law.
The Aguilar Court reiterated that a complaint for a search warrant must enable a neutral and detached magistrate to determine whether probable cause exists - the complaint must do
more than state the conclusions of the officer seeking the warrant. 18 The affidavit in Aguilar failed to pass muster. The allegations contained in the informant's affidavit were mere
conclusions of an unidentified informant. There was no allegation that either the affiant or his source spoke with personal
knowledge. 19 Consequently, the magistrate could not judge for
tions relating to the existence of cause to search is to be deemed insufficient
by virtue of the fact that it sets out not the afflant's observations, but those
of another." 362 U.S. at 269.
14. Id. Justice Douglas dissented to that part of the ruling that there
was probable cause to search on the ground that, although "faceless informers" may give police cause to search, this is not enough, i.e., the magistrate
issuing the warrant must also be convinced: "the magistrate should know
the evidence on which the police propose to act" or else become a "tool of
police interests." Id. at 273 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
15. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
16. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
17. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 (1964) (Footnotes omitted).
18. Id. at 114-15.
19. Id. at 113-14.
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himself whether probable cause existed. The Court reasoned
that:
Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and
need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the
magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics
were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant,
whose identity need
not be disclosed, was "credible" or his infor20
mation "reliable."
In Spinelli v. United States,21 the Court granted certiorari so
that the principles announced in Aguilar could be further explicated.22 In Spinelli, the affidavit at issue was based, in part, on a
report from an unidentified informant and, in part, on an independent FBI investigation purportedly corroborating the informant's tip. The informant, described as "reliable",23 had
advised the FBI that Spinelli was conducting a bookmaking operation and using specified telephone numbers in so doing. The
affidavit also stated that the affiant-special agent and other law
enforcement personnel knew Spinelli as a gambler and bookmaker. 24 The Court found that the affidavit was insufficient on
the ground that the affiant offered the magistrate no facts in sup20. Id. at 114 (citations omitted).
21. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
22. Id. at 413. Both Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) and

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), discussed, in part, search warrants. In Andresen, the Court relied on Aguilar, while finding that the affidavit(s) provided ample probable cause for the search warrant. Andresen,
427 U.S. 463, 478, n.9 (1976). In Zurcher, the Court held that search warrants
are directed at places and things, not persons, and that probable cause to
search does not depend on the culpability of the owner of the premises. A
probable cause discussion is found in Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 556 n.6.
It should be noted that probable cause standards are different as between search warrants and arrest warrants. As the Zurcher Court noted:
Two conclusions necessary to the issuance of the warrant must be
supported by substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact
seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that
the items will be found in the place to be searched. By comparison, the
right of arrest arises only when a crime is committed or attempted in
the presence of the arresting officer or when the officer has 'reasonably
grounds to believe'-sometimes stated 'probable cause to believe'-that
a felony has been committed by the person to be arrested. Although it
would appear that the conclusions which justify either arrest or the issuance of a search warrant must be supported by evidence of the same
degree of probity, it is clear that the conclusions themselves are not
identical.
In the case of arrest, the conclusion concerns the guilt of the arrestee, whereas in the case of search warrants, the conclusions go to the
connection of the items sought with crime and to their present location.
Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 557 n.6, quoting, Comment, 28 U. CHi. L. REv. 664, 687
(1961) (footnotes omitted).
23. 393 U.S. 410, 414 (1969).
24. Id.
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port of his conclusion that the informant was reliable. More importantly, the tip did not contain a statement of the "underlying
circumstances" from which the informer concluded that Spinelli
was conducting a bookmaking operation. 25 Spinelli created the
now familiar "two-pronged" test for determining whether hearsay information is sufficiently credible to constitute probable
cause to issue a search warrant.
The first prong has come to be known as the "basis of knowledge" prong. This refers to the underlying circumstances which
led to the informant's conclusion that criminal activity exists. 26
The second prong is the "veracity" prong, which addresses the
27
credibility of the informant or the reliability of his information.
The basis of knowledge prong is directed at the question of
how the tipster came to his knowledge. That is, did the tipster
see something firsthand, hear something firsthand, or is he
merely passing on a rumor heard from someone else? This
prong is not concerned with the conclusions or opinions of the
tipster, but it is concerned with the raw data of his senses. If the
tip relates events within the tipster's firsthand knowledge and
not the tipster's conclusions, the reviewing magistrate will be
able to draw his own conclusions, rather than rely on those of
28
the tipster.
Under the notion of "self-verifying detail" found in Spinelli
v. United States, 29 an affidavit which does not meet the "basis of
25. 393 U.S. at 416. In Gates, the Illinois Supreme Court found the facts
of Spinelli very similar to those before the Court in these respects. People
v. Gates, 85 Ill.
2d 376, 386, 423 N.E.2d 887, 891 (1981).
26. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 32, 33 and accompanying text.
28. Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 313 A.2d 847 (1974). A concise explanation of the basis of knowledge requirement is found in Stanley where
Judge Moylan wrote:
Aguilar was concerned with the ultimate trustworthiness of hearsay information. All hearsay was not to be rejected out of hand; neither was
all hearsay to be uncritically accepted; some guidelines had to be devised to separate the wheat from the chaff. Aguilar sought first to ascertain the actual source of the incriminating information. The "basis
of knowledge" prong was designed to locate that source and to examine
the validity of his conclusion. It was not concerned with the integrity of
the informant (that test would come later via the other prong) but only
with his ratiocinative process-not with the honesty of his narration
but with the nature of his perception: (How did he reach his conclusion? Did he see something or hear something firsthand or did he
merely pass on a story or rumor from someone else? Or did he simply
jump to a wrong conclusion on the basis of inadequate or ambiguous
observations?). The simple thrust of the "basis of knowledge" prong
was that the informant must not pass on his conclusion, let alone the
conclusion of someone else, but must furnish the raw data of his
senses, so that the reviewing judge could draw his own conclusion from

that data. Id. at 525, 313 A.2d at 858.
29. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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knowledge" test because it fails to set forth the circumstances
under which the confidential information was obtained may be
cured if the information is so detailed that the magistrate "could
reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information
in a reliable way." 30 However, police corroboration may serve to
31
support a claim that the information was reliable.
The second prong of Aguilar may be referred to as the "veracity" prong. For hearsay declarations to support a search warrant, a magistrate must be convinced of the honesty of the
tipster, or of the truthfulness of his information. Concisely
stated, the veracity prong:
Once having located the original source-the person who saw,
heard or smelled something firsthand-then and only then did
Aguilar look to the "veracity" of that source. As a substitute for
the classic trustworthiness device of the oath, it sought some alternative guarantee that the declarant spoke truthfully. It sought
"some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that his informant was 'credible,' or his information 'reliable'." The "veracity" prong, in precise terms, has two disjunctive
spurs, seeking either (a) the inherent "credibility" of the person
himself or (b) some other circumstances reasonably assuring the
"reliability" of the information on the particular occasion of its be32
ing furnished.
The veracity requirement is usually met by a recitation in
the affidavit of previous instances in which the affiant-police officer has obtained information from the informant that led to
33
various arrests and convictions.
30. Id. at 417. As noted in Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 533, 313 A.2d
847, 862 (1974), specificity cannot satisfy the "veracity" prong since "[i If the
informant were concocting a story out of ...whole cloth, he could fabricate
in fine detail as easily as with rough brush strokes." Id.
31. Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 531, 313 A.2d 847, 861-62. Stanley
held that corroboration may not satisfy the basis of knowledge prong.
Courts are not, however, in agreement on this issue. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE,
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.3 (1978);
Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer,25
MERCER L. REV. 741 (1974). The Illinois Supreme Court in Gates found this
issue unnecessary since the nature of the corroboration was insufficient to
satisfy either prong. 85 Ill. 2d 376, 390, 423 N.E.2d 887, 893 (1981).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE,

32. Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 525, 313 A.2d at 858. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), the Court held that a defendant may challenge statements made by an affiant to establish probable cause for a
search warrant if such statements were made with knowledge of their falsity and were critical to finding of probable cause.
33. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 305 (1967) (police officers
need not be required to disclose the informant's identity if trial judge is
convinced that the officers did rely in good faith on credible information

supplied by a reliable tipster). In United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583
(1971), the Court concluded that the alternate "reliability" route of satisfying the veracity prong may be satisfied when an informant admits certain
activities against his own penal interest. Harrisis cited for this proposition

in United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1976). In United
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THE "GOOD-FAITH" EXCEPTION
Against the backdrop of the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis arose
the so-called "good-faith" exception, a concept which has engendered a plethora of legal commentaries in recent years. 34 In
general terms, the good-faith exception, if adopted, would permit the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment but with the reasonable belief that the
search and seizure at issue was consistent with the fourth
amendment. 35 Proponents of the good-faith exception rely on
the argument that since the rationale for the exclusionary rule is
to deter illegal police conduct, the rule should not apply when
police are in good faith attempting to comply with the law. 36 The
following discussion will analyze the pros and cons of the goodfaith exception with special emphasis on the arguments raised
before the United States Supreme Court in Gates.
"The Reasonfor

the Rule"

The exclusionary rule dates back to 1914, when the United
States Supreme Court decided, in Weeks v. United States,37 that

evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of a criminal
defendant's fourth amendment rights could not be admitted in a
federal prosecution. 38 In so doing, the Court enunciated as the
rationale for such an exclusion the judiciary's refusal to sanc39
tion unconstitutional conduct.
States v. McNally, 473 F.2d 934 (3rd Cir. 1973), it was held that Harrisdid not
overrule the two-pronged test. Id. at 938-39.
34. See, e.g., LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On
Drawing Bright Lines' and 'Good Faith', 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 307 (1982);
Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations and
Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875 (1982); Wilkey, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment by Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, National Legal Center for the Public Interest (1982); LaFave, The Exclusionary
Rule Bills: Hearings on S.1O1, S.751 and S.1995 Before the Subcomm. on
CriminalLaw of the Sen. Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess., 329, 793-974 (1981);
Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L. REV. 365

(1981).
35. For an excellent discussion of the good-faith exception, see Mertens
& Wasserstrom, supra note 34, at 365.
36. See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief on Reargument, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.
Ct. 2317 (1983).
37. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
38. Id. at 398. Use of such improperly obtained evidence at trial is tantamount to prejudicial error. Id.
39. The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the
United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such
power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons,
houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and
seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike,
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It was not until 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,40 that the exclusionary rule was applied to the states via the fourteenth amendment. By some interpretations, the Mapp Court went so far as
to state that the exclusionary rule was constitutionally mandated, rather than a mere rule of evidence. 4 1 Mapp reiterated
that "the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way -

by removing the incentive to disregard it.' "42

As a secondary rationale, of special importance when the results
of the rule seem unfair,4 3 is the "imperative" of judicial integrity. 44 The Mapp Court explained that the government's disregard of its own laws could have a destructive effect and would
breed contempt for the law.4 5 In light of the various exceptions
already carved out of the exclusionary rule, the concept of judicial integrity seems to have fallen by the wayside. 46
In various instances the Supreme Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule, usually in reliance on a "reason for
the rule" analysis. For example, illegally seized evidence is adwhether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and
effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with
the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the
criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful
seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support
of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to
appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.
232 U.S. at 391-92.
The Weeks Court refused to apply the same sanction to papers and property

seized by police on the ground the fourth amendment applied only to federal officials. Id. at 398.
40. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Prior to Mapp, the Court rejected the "silver
platter" doctrine which had permitted the federal courts to use evidence
seized in violation of the United States Constitution by state agents. See
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Mapp expressly overruled Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to the states.
Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. The Wolf Court had refused to require state courts to
enforce the fourth amendment via the exclusionary rule. Wolf, 338 U.S. 25.
41. The Mapp Court characterized the exclusionary rule as "an essential part" of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
42. 367 U.S. at 656, quoting, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at 217. See
also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965) (exclusion is necessary
as "an effective deterrent to illegal police action").
43. That is, when the criminal goes free "because the constable has
blundered." People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).

44. 367 U.S. 643, 659, quoting, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222
(1960).
45. Id. at 659, citing, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (J. Brandeis dissenting).
46. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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missible in grand jury proceedings on the ground that any benefit obtained by exclusion is outweighed by the detriment to
grand jury functions. 47 In United States v. Havens,48 the Court

refused to apply the rule when unlawfully obtained evidence
was used to impeach the defendant's testimony at his criminal
trial. The rule does not apply in certain civil tax proceedings,
again because the societal costs 4of
exclusion outweigh any po9
tential deterrent effect on police.
The increasingly stringent standing requirements have cast
further limits on the rule. 50 For example, dissatisfaction on the
part of the Supreme Court was clearly manifested in both the
holding and dissent of Stone.5 ' In Stone, the majority denied
federal habeas corpus relief on fourth amendment claims to
state court prisioners who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims in state court.5 2 Justice White's dissent went
even further. Justice White argued for a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule. 53 His dissent would assume great impor-

tance in future cases.
United States v. Williams

Given the exceptions to the exclusionary rule as a manifestation of judicial distaste for its operation, it should have come
as no surprise that the broader good-faith exception would eventually be advanced. Dissatisfaction with the rule eventually
culminated in United States v. Williams.54 In Williams, the

Fifth Circuit expressly adopted the good-faith exception. The
battle commenced.
The facts of Williams are of particular interest because the
court need never have reached the good faith issue. In June
1976, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency, Special Agent
Markonni, arrested Jo Ann Williams in Ohio for possession of a
controlled substance. 55 Williams eventually pled guilty and was
47. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974).

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980).
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976).
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36 (1980).
428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Id. at 494.
Id. at 541-42.
54. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).

55. Id. at 833. The suspect was allegedly in possession of heroin and
charged with a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1976) of the Controlled
Substances Act which provides: "Except as authorized by this subchapter,
it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally - (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance .... "
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sentenced to three years imprisonment.5 6 She was released on
bond pending appeal. A condition of her release was that she
57
remain in Ohio.
Some months later Agent Markonni, on assignment at the
Atlanta International Airport, recognized Williams as she disembarked from a nonstop flight from Los Angeles. 5 8 Markonni
was aware of Williams' previous conviction and the travel restrictions of her appeal bond.59 He eventually arrested Williams
for violation of the travel restrictions.6 0 A search incident to the
61
arrest uncovered a packet of heroin in Williams' coat pocket.
Williams moved to suppress all evidence of the heroin on the
ground that Agent Markonni had no authority to arrest her for
violating the bond restrictions. 6 2 The trial court agreed and the
63
government appealed.
A panel for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
government's argument that Markonni had probable cause to ar64
rest Williams for violating the conditions of her bail release.
The government also argued that Markonni could have validly
arrested Williams for violating the travel restrictions of her appeal bond. 65 The government's theory was that such a violation
constituted a criminal offense and that the arrest was valid
under the Bail Reform Act.66 The court disagreed 67 and held
56. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 833. Prior to pleading guilty,
the defendant made a motion to suppress the heroin, but this motion was
denied. Id.
57. Id.

58. Id. at 834.
59. Id. at 835. Markonni identified himself and asked Williams for identification and her airline ticket. The ticket indicated she was en route to
Lexington, Kentucky. Markonni then asked Williams if she had permission

to travel outside Ohio, and she replied "no," that this was the "first time."
Id. She told Markonni she was going to Lexington because she now lived
there. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 835. Markonni arrested Williams a second time for violation of
the Controlled Substances Act. The following day, Markonni sought and
obtained a search warrant for Williams' luggage, based on the heroin found
on her person and Markonni's prior dealings with her. Id. at 834-35. The

search of the luggage revealed more heroin. Id. at 835.
63. United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 97-98 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 622
F.2d 830 (1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
64. 594 F.2d at 92. The court held that bail jumping must involve a willful failure to appear in court. Markonni had no reason to believe that Williams had missed a court appearance. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3152 (1976).

67. 594 F.2d at 94. The court stated that the violation of a bond condition
merely authorizes a court to determine whether punitive action is warranted; it does not authorize a warrantless arrest. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3146(c),
the judge who imposed the travel restriction is authorized to issue an arrest
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that the arrest was invalid and the heroin should be supressed. 68
Judge Clark dissented, contending that the heroin should not be
suppressed. 69 Judge Clark reasoned that the deterrent purpose
of the exclusionary rule was not served because the officer did
not act "in a way he either knew or should have known was
'70
wrongful.
The unusual events that followed indicate that the Fifth Circuit was eager to adopt a good faith exception. A rehearing was
granted on the court's own motion and the government filed a
supplemental brief arguing the good-faith exception. 71 The
court issued two separate majority opinions reversing the district court.7 2 In the first, a sixteen-judge majority held that Williams had committed criminal contempt by violating the
conditions of her appeal bond and that Markonni therefore had
authority for arresting her on that ground. 73 In the second opinion, thirteen judges reversed the lower court on the ground that
the heroin should not have been suppressed because Agent
74
Markonni acted in good faith.
The second majority in Williams invoked a traditional "reason for the rule" analysis in adopting the good-faith exception:
[W] e now hold that evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule where it is discovered by officers in the course of
actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though
mistaken, belief that they are authorized. We do so because the
exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or flagrant actions by pothe reason for the rule
lice, not reasonable, good-faith ones. Where
75
ceases, its application must cease also.
The court identified two types of violations of the probable
warrant if the restriction is violated. In Williams, no such warrant was issued. Id. at 93-94.
68. Id. at 95.
69. Id. at 97 (Clark, J., dissenting).
70. Id.

71. Id. at 98; see United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).

72. All twenty-four judges joined in one of the two majority opinions;
five judges joined in both. None of the judges dissented, but two special
concurrences were filed. Two of the judges who joined in the second majority opinion concurred specially on the ground that it was proper to decide
whether the evidence was admissible under the good faith exception rather
than deciding whether the search was valid. 622 F.2d at 847.
73. Id. at 836-39. Ms. Williams was found to have violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 401(3), in that her willful breach of the bond restriction was a criminal
contempt. The arrest itself was found valid under 21 U.S.C. § 878(3) be-

cause the defendant's criminal contempt was "an offense against the United
States." Id. at 839.
74. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 846-47. For an exhaustive critique of the second opinion, see Mertons & Wasserstrom, supra note 34, at
365.

75. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 840.
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cause requirement of the fourth amendment. 76 The first was
termed a "good faith mistake". 77 The second, "technical violation" occurs when an officer has relied on a statute later ruled
unconstitutional, a judicial precedent later overruled, or a warrant later invalidated. 78 According to the court, technical violations have 9already been accorded the benefit of the good-faith
7
exception.
The Williams court then addressed the "good-faith mistake"
facet of the exclusionary rule80 and concluded that Agent
Markonni arrested Williams in the good faith belief that Williams was in violation of a federal statute relating to bond conditions.8 1 There being no question that Agent Markonni acted
reasonably, the court found that the evidence should not have
82
been suppressed.
76. Id. at 840-41, citing, Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment:
The Reasonable Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. &

CRIMONOLOGY 635, 638-39 (1978).
77. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 841.

78. Id.

79. Id. In support, the court cited Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31

(1979), in which the Supreme Court admitted evidence seized after a war-

rantless arrest based on the violation of a statute later held unconstitutional. See also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (evidence seized
in border search; statute later found unconstitutional as construed); United
States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848
(1976) (statute held unconstitutional); United States v. Kilgen, 445 F.2d 287
(5th Cir. 1971) (city ordinance held unconstitutional).
The Williams Courts' interpretation of the above-cited cases as support
for a good faith exception is subject to substantial criticism. First, such

cases are factually distinguishable from Williams. Second, probable cause

existed at the time of arrest in each case. See Mertons and Wasserstrom,
supra note 34, at 425-26.
80. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 844. Some judicially created
exceptions were cited, such as United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). In
Janis, the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained in good faith reliance on a search warrant by state police was admissible in a federal tax
proceeding although the warrant was later found defective. Also relied on
was Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). Tucker is actually a fifth
amendment case in which a suspect was interrogated by police without first
having been given Miranda warnings. Because the police acted in good
faith, the statements made by the suspect were admitted. Id. at 447. The
Williams court also relied on United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975), and United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d
77 (5th Cir. 1979).
81. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 846. The statute relied on was
18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1982), which deals with the court's power to impose bond

restrictions. The Williams court had first determined that § 3146 relates

only to bond violations which involved missing a court appearance. The
court noted that the Fifth Circuit had not, at the time of Williams' arrest,
decided the precise scope of § 3146. Thus, the case was found to involve
both facets - "technical violation" and "good faith mistake" - of the exclusionary rule. Id.
82. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 847.
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ILLINOIS V. GATES

With Aguilar and Spinelli providing the established test for
determining the validity of an affidavit for a search warrant
based on hearsay information from a confidential informant, and
the spectre of the good faith exception lurking in the background, the case of Illinois v. Gates arose. 83 The Supreme
Court had denied certiorari on United States v. Williams,84 the
seminal case on good faith, before Gates came up for oral argument. In fact, Williams was decided before Gates was heard in
the Illinois Supreme Court.8 5 The State of Illinois did not raise
the good faith issue before the United States Supreme Court in
their Petition for Certiorari, and the State's subsequent motion
to include this issue was denied.8 6 It appeared then, that Gates
would not be the vehicle by which the good-faith exception
reached the United States Supreme Court. Oral argument was
heard on the original question presented for review in October,
1982. Then, in an extraordinary move, the Court, sua sponte, requested that the parties address the following additional
question:
[W] hether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to
require the exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief
83. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). Prior to Gates, the United States Supreme
Court had never determined under what circumstances a tip from an anonymous informant may constitute probable cause. A confidential informant
is one whose identity is known to the law enforcement official. In McCray v.
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312-14 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held
that police are not required to divulge the identity of a confidential informant when the information he provides results in the suspect's arrest. A citizen informant is one who reports criminal conduct to the police as a matter
of civic duty. Such persons are generally considered more reliable than the
confidential informant, who is usually himself a member of the criminal milieu. See Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration,and ProbableCause:
Reconciling the Spinelli/Draper Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 AMER.

CRimi.L. REV. 99, n.1 (1982) (herinafter cited as Anonymous Tips).
Some commentators have contended that a tip from an anonymous informant is presumptively unreliable because neither the magistrate nor law
enforcement officials can determine his motives-i.e., revenge or civic duty.
See Anonymous Tips, supra, at 107. By definition, it would be most difficult

to establish the reliability of such a tipster. It has been suggested that the
specificity of the tip and police corroboration of incriminating details should
satisfy the reliability test. Id. at 123. As will be seen, the United States
Supreme Court declined to adopt a separate test for anonymous tipsters.
84. 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
85. Williams was decided on July 31, 1980. Williams, 622 F.2d 830. The
Illinois Supreme Court decided Gates on June 26, 1981. People v. Gates, 85
Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981). Neither the Williams case nor the good
faith issue was raised before any of the Illinois courts hearing Gates.
86. 102 S.Ct. 1607 (1982).
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that the search
and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth
87
Amendment.
It appeared that the future of the exclusionary rule would soon
be determined under the following facts.
On May 3,1978, the Bloomingdale, Illinois police department
received an anonymous handwritten letter by mail which alleged that Lance and Susan Gates were drug dealers. 88 The letter further stated that the Gates were planning a trip to Florida
for the purpose of obtaining illegal drugs.
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who
strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance
Gates, they live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue, his wife,
drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with
drugs, then Lance flys [sic] down and drives it back. Sue flys [sic]
back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 [sic] she is driving down there again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to
drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the
trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have
over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make
their entire living on pushers.
I guarantee [sic] if you watch them carefully you will make a
big catch. They are friends with some big drugs [sic] dealers, who
visit their house often.
Lance & Susan Gates
Greenway
89
in Condominiums.
The Bloomingdale Chief of Police passed the letter on to
Detective Charles Mader. 90 Mader requested a specific address
for the Gates' from the Secretary of State's office in
Springfield. 91
It was discovered that an Illinois driver's license had been
issued to a Lance Gates who resided at 209-D Darthmouth,
Bloomingdale, illinois. 92 Mader then communicated with a "reliable" informant 93 who reviewed financial records and reported
that Lance Gates resided at 198-B Greenway Drive, Blooming94
dale, Illinois.
87. Order of November 29, 1982, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982).
88. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (1983).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. This person was described as "a confidential informant who had provided reliable information to Mader during the previous two years." Petitioner's Opening Brief on Merits at 3, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
94. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2325 (1983).
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A Chicago police officer assigned to O'Hare Airport informed Mader that an L. Gates had made a reservation with
Eastern Airlines on Flight 245, departing on May 5 at 4:15 P.M.
and arriving in West Palm Beach, Florida. 95 On May 5, Mader
spoke to William Morely, an agent with the D.E.A. Morely told
Mader that an individual using the name Lance Gates boarded
Flight 245.96 On May 6, Morely informed Mader that Gates had
arrived in West Palm Beach, took a cab to the West Palm Beach
97
Holiday Inn and entered a room registered to Susan Gates.
Gates and an unidentified woman left the room at 7:00 A.M. and
entered a car with Illinois plates. 98 The plates were registered to
Lance B. Gates but were issued for a different car.99 The car was
last seen driving north on an interstate highway.'0 0
Based on this information, Mader obtained a search warrant
from the Circuit Court of DuPage County for both the Gates'
Bloomingdale residence and the car they had been driving in
Florida.' 01 In the early morning hours of May 7, the Gates returned to their home on Greenway Drive and were immediately
served with a search warrant. 10 2 A search of the car revealed
approximately 350 pounds of marijuana in several large bundles. 10 3 Upon searching the Gates' residence, Bloomingdale police discovered more marijuana and also weapons, ammunition,
and drug parphernalia.' l 4 The Gates were indicted for unlawful
possession of cannibis with intent to deliver'0 5 and unlawful
possession of a controlled substance. 0 6 Lance Gates was sepa07
rately indicted for possession of an unlicensed firearm.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2325-26.
Id.
Id. at 2326.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2320.

103. Id. at 2326.

104. Id.
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 561/2, § 705(e) (1975). "It is unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver or
manufacture cannabis. Any person who violates this Section ... is guilty
of a ... felony." Id.
106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 561/2, § 1402(b) (1975). "[Ilt is unlawful for any
person knowingly to possess a controlled substance. Any person who violates this Section ... is guilty of a ... felony." Id.
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 83-2 (1975). "No person may acquire or possess any firearm... without having in his possession a Firearms Owner's
Identification Card." Id.
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The Motion to Suppress
Attorney James W. Reilley, for the defendants, filed a motion to quash the search warrant and suppress all evidence
thereby obtained before Circuit Court Judge William Hopf. 0 8
The motion presented the following allegations: (1) the affidavit
failed to allege any illegal activity on the Gates' part, (2) the author of the anonymous letter was not a reliable informant in that
there was no claim he or she had ever provided information in
the past, 10 9 (3) there was no allegation the informant had any
personal knowledge of illegal activity on the defendants' part, 10
(4) the letter failed to state the underlying circumstances from
which the magistrate could conclude the information was reliable, and (5) the affidavit failed to meet the test of United States
v. Harris"' in that no criminal activity was corroborated nor
was there any basis for crediting the hearsay on the ground of
2
statement against penal interest."
Judge Hopf agreed that the search warrant should be
quashed and the evidence suppressed." 3 The State appealed
the suppression order solely on the issue of whether the warrant
and affidavit in support thereof met the Aguilar-Spinelli
4
standards."
The Illinois Courts
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court." 5 In an
opinion written by Justice Lindberg of the Second District, the
initial issue addressed was whether the affidavit met the basis of
108. Defendant's Motion to Suppress, People v. Gates, No. 78 CF 658, 659

(Cir. ct. in).
109. This allegation was obviously based on the reliability prong of Aguilar and Spinelli.

110. This speaks to the "basis of knowledge" prong of Aguilar and
Spinelli.
111. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
112. See supra note 33.
113. People v. Gates, No. 78 CF 658, 659, 78 CM 1764, slip. op. at 2 (Cir. Ct.
IMI. October 26, 1978). The court noted that the letter failed to indicate how
the informant received his information, e.g., the basis of knowledge, nor was
there a statement against penal interest. As to corroboration, the court
noted that the investigation merely corroborated the conclusory allegations
made in the letter and failed to reveal any per se criminal activities. Judge
Hopf admitted that in close cases preference should be given in favor of
probable cause when the validity of a warrant is at issue, but stated: "However, I am also concerned for a possible danger fraught by the issuance of a
search warrant which relies so heavily upon an anonymous letter which
gives us no clue as to the relationship or how information was procured."
(Tr. MTS. at 13).

114. People v. Gates, 82 111. App. 3d 749, 403 N.E.2d 77 (1980).
115. Id.
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knowledge prong of Aguilar.116 The court quickly concluded
that this test was not satisfied. The affidavit did not reveal the
manner in which the anonymous tipster obtained his information. 117 The question thus became "whether the judge could
reasonably infer that the information was gained in a reliable
fashion because of the great amount of detail supplied by the
informer." 118 The court concluded, using Draper v. United
States"1 9 as a yardstick, that the detail in the anonymous letter
could not pass muster - the letter contained no more than "general allegations" that the Gates were involved in narcotics
sales. 20 Nor could the judge reasonably assume the informant
spoke from personal knowledge. In contrast to the letter in
Gates, the informant in Draper gave specific details as to the
21
physical description and travel plans of the suspect.'
The final question before the appellate court was whether
independent police corroboration cured the defective affidavit. 122 The State's claim of "full corroboration" was summarily
116. Id. at 753, 403 N.E.2d at 80 (1980).
117. Id. at 755, 403 N.E.2d at 80. In contrast, the court cited People v.
Gomez, 80 IIl. App. 3d 668, 399 N.E.2d 1030 (1980), in which the affidavit
stated that the informant had personal knowledge that a crime had been
committed, and People v. Swift, 61111. App. 3d 486, 378 N.E.2d 234 (1978), in
which the defendant requested the informer to participate in the crime.
118. People v. Gates, 82 1l. App. 3d 749, 753, 403 N.E.2d 77, 80 (1980), citing, Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 (1968) (self-verifying detail

could satisfy basis of knowledge prong).
119. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).

120. People v. Gates, 82 11. App. 3d 749, 754, 403 N.E.2d 77, 80-81 (1980). In

particular, the court noted that there was a lack of detail regarding the Florida trip. Id. at 754, 403 N.E.2d at 81.

121. Id. at 754, 403 N.E.2d at 80-81. The anonymous letter contains no
more than general allegations that defendants were involved in narcotics sales. Although the anonymous informer did state that the Gates
would soon drive to Florida and return with a load of drugs in their car,
no details regarding this trip were set forth in the letter. These general
allegations fall far short of the specifics necessary for a judge to properly infer that the anonymous informer had gathered his information in
a reliable way. Nor could the judge reasonably assume that the anonymous informer had personal knowledge on the basis of the statements
set forth in the anonymous letter. In contrast to the case at bar, the
informer in Draper supplied police with a detailed physicial description
of the accused, the time and date of his arrival in Denver by train, and a
description of the clothes he would be wearing. The informer also
stated that the accused had a habit of walking very fast. (Draper,358
U.S. at 309-10 [(1959)]). When confronted with such detail, a judge
could reasonably infer that the informer either had personal knowledge
of the transaction or had obtained his information in a reliable way.
The informer in the instant case set forth few details, however, and he
may have obtained his information through rumor or through another
unreliable method.
Id.
122. Id.
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rejected. 123 In fact, the court stated that corroboration may only
satisfy the veracity prong of Aguilar; it cannot serve to establish
that the informant obtained his information in a reliable manner. 124 In conclusion, the court stated that to accept the State's
argument "would permit government invasion of the privacy of
persons solely on the basis of anonymous tips, made perhaps
out of spite or based upon unsubstantiated rumor" 125 simply1 26because the police were able to corroborate innocent details.
The State once again appealed, and once again the
good-faith exception was neither briefed nor argued. 127 Citing
Aguilar, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate
court that the informant's letter did not meet the basis of knowledge prong. 128 Although the court could have concluded its
opinion at this point, the majority instead chose to comment on
the veracity prong. 29 Again, the affidavit failed to pass muster.
There was no declaration against penal interest which would
30
provide any indicia of reliability.
Next the Gates court considered whether the information
was so detailed that the magistrate "'could reasonably infer that
the informant had gained his information in a reliable way.'"131
123.
124.
State,
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 754-55, 403 N.E.2d at 81. In support, the court cited Stanley v.
19 Md. App. 508, 531, 313 A.2d 847, 861-62 (1974).
People v. Gates, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 755, 403 N.E.2d at 81.
Id. But see, United States v. Tuley, 546 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1977)

(probable cause found though source not revealed because innocent detail
sufficiently corroborated), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837; United States v. Myers,
538 F.2d 424 (D.D.C. 1976) (corroboration of innocent details coupled with
defendant's sufficient for probable cause), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908; Horton

v. State, 262 Ark. 211, 555 S.W.2d 226 (1977) (information from reliable in-

formant sufficient basis for probable cause; State v. Gilbert, 24 Or. App. 907,
547 P.2d 632 (1976) (probable cause based on corroboration of innocent
details).
127. The unusual circumstances under which the good faith issue came
before the United States Supreme Court is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 80-87.
128. People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 383-84, 423 N.E.2d 887, 890 (1981). The

majority opinion was written by Justice Ward. Justice Moran wrote a dis-

senting opinion in which Justice Underwood joined. As grounds for their

finding, the majority noted that, although the informant stated that the
Gates made their living by dealing in drugs, he failed to state the source of
his knowledge. No basis of knowledge for allegations regarding the Florida
trip and the existence of drugs in the Gates' basement was given. Further,
"[t]here is no statement made that the informant ever saw drugs or was
inside the defendants' residence or even that someone had told him of any
of these claimed facts." Id. at 384, 423 N.E.2d at 890.
129. Id. at 384, 423 N.E.2d at 890-91.
130. Id. at 385-86, 423 N.E.2d at 891.
131. Id. at 387-88, 423 N.E.2d at 891-92 quoting Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410, 417 (1969)). Under Spinelli, the type of detail supplied by the
informant in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), provides a suitable
yardstick by which to determine whether sufficient specifity exists. Self-
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The Court first enunciated the concept that self-verifying detail
may cure a defect in the basis of knowledge in Spinelli.132 A
review of the letter led the Gates court to conclude that the let133
ter lacked the necessary specificity.
Finally, police corroboration did not cure the basis of knowledge defect. 34 The corroboration was only of innocent activity,
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. 135 The dissenting justices argued that the necessary specificity of detail
and police corroboration existed to show that the informant had
136
obtained his information in a reliable manner.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the question
originally presented for review was "[w]hether detailed information provided to police by an anonymous informer, coupled
with government corroboration of the information, provided
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.''137 Ultimately, the good faith issue was also briefed and argued. 138 Because the Court's disposition of Gates never settled the question
of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the arguments on probable cause are relevant and merit discussion.
verifying detail may only be used when the informant has failed to meet the
basis of knowledge prong - it may not cure a failure in the veracity prong.
The Gates court cautioned against the use of self-verifying detail; the detail
must be such that the magistrate can determine that the informant is relying upon more than casual rumor or accusations based only on the suspect's general reputation. People v. Gates, 85 Ill.
2d at 388, 423 N.E.2d at 892.
132. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
133. 85 Ill.
2d 376, 389, 423 N.E.2d 887, 891-93. The court noted that, unlike
the informant in Draper,the informant in Gates, was anonymous. Id.
134. Id. at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893. The court did not decide as had the
appellate court, that police corroboration could not cure the veracity prong,
although courts are not in agreement on this issue.
135. Id. at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 894, citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(1971).
136. Id. at 390-91, 423 N.E.2d at 893-96. The dissenters reviewed the affidavits in Aguilar and Spinelli and the testimony of the agent in Draper and
contended that, as in Draper, "a specific, detailed and future sequence of
events was supplied by the informant's letter," and, in Gates, as in Draper,
the police investigation corroborated every detail of the information. Further, the dissenters claimed, both specificity and detail satisfied the veracity
prong. Id. at 393-95, 423 N.E.2d at 893-96.
137. Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari at i, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317 (1983). Jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3), the state
claiming that the defendants had set up a violation of the United States
Constitution in the courts below. Whether federal jurisdiction truly existed
became a substantial issue in the defendant's case. See infra notes 185-187
and accompanying text.
138. Petitioner's Brief on Reargument, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317
(1983).
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The State's Case
Illinois first claimed that the magistrate's determination of
probable cause was proper - that the facts and circumstances
before him had been sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that illegal drugs were in the Gates' car and home. 139 In
support of this argument, the State relied on the anonymous letter and police corroboration of the tip. The letter, it was
claimed, described the Gates' activities "in detail," describing
the defendants by name. The "detail" relied on was, in essence,
merely a repetition of the contents of the letter. The State characterized the tipster as "an ordinary citizen who volunteered his
information"'140 with no financial incentive to fabricate accusations. In support of its claim of corroboration, the State pointed
to the following facts contained in the letter which were verified:
the Gates' address, the fact that Lance Gates flew to Florida on
May 5, that upon arrival he went to a room registered to his wife,
141
and the circumstances of the Gates' departure the next day.
The State also claimed that the affidavit was sufficient under
Aguilar and Spinelli.142 Finally, the State asserted that Agui-

lar's two-prong test should be overruled and the Court should
"return" to the rule of Jones v. United States 143 - that probable
cause could be founded on hearsay as long as there existed a
"substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay.'" The State referred to this as the "traditional standard,"'145 claiming that
Aguilar's two-pronged analysis in many instances proved "unworkable", 1' was often disregarded by the courts, 147 and served
139. Petitioner's Opening Brief on Merits at 7-8, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.

Ct. 23i7 (1983).

140. Id. at 8-9.
141. Id. at 9. The state also noted that the circumstances revealed by the
investigation lent reliability to the tip. Id.
142. Id. at 16-17. The state claimed that the facts presented were more
like Draperthan Aguilar and Spinelli - that the search warrant was more

detailed, the corroboration more extensive and the surrounding circumstances more reliable indicia of probably cause than in Aguilar and in
Spinelli. The veracity prong of Aguilar was met because of police corroboration and because the "citizen informant" was without any motive to lie.
Id. at 17-21. The basis of knowledge prong was met by the "detail" of the
informant's letter and police corroboration.
143. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). For a discussion of Jones, see supra notes 11-14
and accompanying text.
144. Petitioner's Opening Brief on the Merits at 24-25, Illinois v. Gates,
103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
145. Id. at 24-26.
146. For example, a citizen informer who had never given tips in the past
could not meet the veracity prong. Further, the basis of knowledge prong
posed difflculties because witnesses often express themselves in conclusory terms.
147. In support of this, the state cited Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Jaben v. United States, 381
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to confuse the police. 148 Accordingly, the State urged the Court

to "return" to the prior, more practical and nontechnical rule of
Brinegar149 and Jones,15° under which all hearsay is "admissible," its weight to be determined by the facts and circumstances
15 1
of each particular case.
In reply, the respondents argued that Aguilar should not be
overruled and was merely a refinement of both Draperv. United
States and Jones.152 In support, the respondents traced the
evolution of hearsay as it relates to probable cause and contended that the affidavit failed to meet the veracity prong of the
Aguilar test. Second, it was claimed that the Court should
either remand the case to the Illinois Supreme Court for clarification or dismiss the certiorari petition as having been improvidently granted because the record below did not indicate
whether the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court was based
on the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or
both. 53 In essence, the respondents were claiming that there
may have been an independent and adequate state ground for
the findings of the Illinois Supreme Court.154 It was in this posture that oral arguments were first had before the Court in October of 1982. Round two began the next month, when the parties
were requested to address the good-faith issue.
In support of the good-faith exception, the State pointed to
instances in which the exclusionary rule had been invoked although its deterrence rationale was not applicable because of
U.S. 214 (1965). Petitioner's Opening Brief on the Merits at 24, Illinois v.

Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
148. Petitioner's Opening Brief on the Merits at

28-29, Illinois v. Gates,

103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).

149. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), cited for the proposition that probable cause deals with probablities, not technicalities.
150. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
151. Petitioner's Opening Brief on the Merits at 24-31, Illinois v. Gates,
103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983).
152. Brief for the Repsondents at 7-8, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317
(1983).
153. Id. at 24-27.
154. See California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972). The respondents cited
People v. Martin, 70 Ill. App. 3d 36, 388 N.E.2d 278 (1979), for the proposition
that there existed a state standard of probable cause. Also relied on was
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12(a)(2) (1979), which permits a defendant to
challenge an unlawful search or seizure and to suppress any evidence on
the ground that probable cause did not exist for the issuance of the search
warrant.
The respondent's final argument was that many of the cases relied on
by the state were inapplicable to the instant case because they involved
warrantless arrests and searches and were distinguishable on other facts.
Brief for the Respondents at 27-30, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
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the absence of police misconduct. 155 The State claimed that, to
avoid such unjust results, a magistrate's reasonable determination of probable cause should not be overturned on a motion to
suppress when the reviewing judge is of the opinion that the
magistrate was mistaken. 156 In such cases, the deterrence rationale is simply not served. 157 By the time of the motion to suppress, the fourth amendment violation is complete. The proper
inquiry, then, is whether deterrence of future police misconduct
would be served by suppression. When police have acted reasonably, the State argued, suppression can only keep probative,
reliable evidence from the trier of fact. 158 Finally, the State once
again urged a "return" to the previous standard of Brinegar and
Jones.159

On reargument, the respondent's first, and perhaps most
persuasive, argument was that the judgment below was supported by an independent and adequate state ground. Thus, the
case at bar did not present the proper occasion to consider
160
whether the federal exclusionary rule should be modified.
The respondents noted that the Illinois Supreme Court cited
both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution. In 1923, Illinois adopted an exclusionary rule in People v. Brocamp, 16 1 almost forty years before the federal equivalent was applied to the
states in Mapp v. Ohio.162 Although the Court in Wolf v. Colo155. See, e.g., People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 369 (1971) (complaint did not show probable cause for search warrant); People v. Palanza,
55 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 371 N.E.2d 687 (1978) (information for search warrant
was not proven credible); People v. Davenport, 19 111. App. 3d 426, 311 N.E.2d
751 (1974) (affidavit insufficient to allow for search warrant); Bridger v.
State, 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1974) (hearsay information must prove more
than suspicion to obtain search warrant).
156. Petitioner's Brief on Reargument at 11, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317 (1983).
157. The state also claimed that neither is the judicial integrity rationale
served, for the same reasons. It characterized this as meaning simply that a
court should not encourage violations of constitutional rights. Id. at 14.
158. Petitioner's Opening Brief on the Merits at 29, Illinois v. Gates 103 S.
Ct. 2317 (1983), citing, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1946) (White, J.,
concurring).
159. Petitioner's Opening Brief on the Merits at 16-18, Illinois v. Gates,
103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983).
160. Respondents' Brief on Reargument at 6-10, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.
Ct. 2317 (1983).
161. 307 111. 448, 138 N.E.728, 732 (1923). The Illinois Supreme Court
stated, "[our] holding is that the unlawful search and seizure aforesaid violates the provision of our [Illinois] State Constitution." (emphasis added)
See also People v. Perry, 1 Ill. 2d 482, 116 N.E.2d 360 (1953); People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 142 N.E. 112 (1924).
162. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In fact, Illinois adopted the rule before Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), in which the fourth amendment was made
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rado163 refused to apply the exclusionary rule to the states, the
respondents pointed out, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to
follow Wolf and abandon the State exclusionary rule.'6 The Illinois courts are free, the respondents contended, to impose a
higher standard on searches and seizures than that required by
the Federal Constitution. 1 65 Finally, the respondents claimed
that the record below was insufficient to 16determine
whether the
6
police or magistrate acted in good faith.
As for the good-faith exception itself, the respondents' argument was that its adoption would dilute the deterrent purpose of
167
the exclusionary rule as well as the law of probable cause.
168
While acknowledging other exceptions to the rule,' the respondents characterized a good faith exception as qualitatively different - no other exception abolished the constitutional
169
mandate of probable cause to search.
It was pointed out by the respondents that the fourth
amendment by its terms prohibited "unreasonable" searches 170
a "reasonable mistake" exception was therefore illogical.
binding on the states, but the court declined to apply the exclusionary rule
to the states.
163. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
164. See City of Chicago v. Lord, 7 Ill. 2d 379, 130 N.E.2d 504 (1955) (noting
that the Illinois exclusionary rule rests on "state and federal constitutional

consideration").
165. Respondents' Brief on Reargument at 10, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.

2317 (1983), citing, Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). See also,
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (detailed discussion of state's rights).
166. Respondents' Brief of Reargument at 11, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317 (1983). The respondents also argued that the State had waived the issue of good faith by failing to raise it in the courts below. Id.
167. Id. at 16-47.
168. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary
rule not applicable in grand jury proceedings).
169. Respondents' Brief on Reargument at 21, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317 (1983).
170. Id. at 32-33. In support, respondent quoted the following testimony:
In short, the fourth amendment already has a reasonableness requirement in it. When the courts say that a search was no good, or a pat
down was no good, they are telling the police officer, 'You acted unreasonably,' The objective standard, a reasonable police officer under
those circumstances would have known that this was not sufficient for a
pat down, it was not sufficient for a stop, it was not sufficient for a full
search. That is what the fourth amendment says against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Exclusionary Rule Bills: Hearingson S. 101,
S. 751 and S. 1995 Before the Subcommitte on CriminalLaw of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 152 (1981)(testimony of Leon Friedman) [hereinafter Hearings]. Similarly, another
commentator warns:
Inclusion of the reasonableness prong in the good faith test is, in
fact, somewhat ironic given that the fourth amendment proscription is itself couched in the language of reasonableness. Where a
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Moreover, under the facts of the case, the "mistake" could not
be characterized as reasonable. 171 To adopt a good faith or reasonable belief exception would make warrants unreviewable by
a neutral and detached magistrate - the decision to search, respondents warned, would be entirely within the discretion of
law enforcement personnel. As for the deterrence function of
the rule, the respondents pointed out:
Much of the discussion of deterrence and police conduct in the
briefs of Petitioner and supporting amici totally fails to comprehend that the law of search and seizure must apply to institutions,
not just to individuals. Particularly in a warrant setting, a search is
likely to involve a chain of individual officers who are involved in
the investigation, the application for a warrant, and the actual conduct of the search. In short, warrant searches are institutional actions. It makes no sense to try to judge the 'good faith,'
actions by
'reasonableness' or 'good conduct' of such institutional
1 72
looking only to the behavior of a single officer.
court applying the good faith test holds that an officer's erroneous
belief was reasonable, the court will in effect be suggesting that
either (1) it is permissible for an officer to be ignorant of certain
portions of the fourth amendment, or (2) it is permissible for an
officer to use less than his best judgment, perception, or efforts in
seeking to comply with fourth amendment requirements. In
other words, all that is required of officers is a reasonable good
faith attempt to conform to the law. This sounds reasonable until, of course, one considers extending the same innocuous language to other areas like legislators and the first amendment, or
to defendants in antitrust cases.
Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations
and Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 875, 897-98
(1982) (footnotes omitted).
171. On this point, the respondents stated that it was unreasonable to
base a warrant on a tip of unknown origin or reliability and the police corroboration was of entirely innocent activity. Thus, there was misconduct on
the objective, malum prohibitum standard. The lack of intensive investigative efforts by police belied the State's claim that no intentional misconduct

occurred. The respondents also questioned the propriety of an objective
standard which would disallow an inquiry into the actual good faith of the

police. Respondents' Brief on Reargument at 22-31, 43-47, Illinois v. Gates,
103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
172. Id. at 47-48. See also The Exclusionary Rule Bills: Hearingson S-101,
S. 751 and S. 1995 Before the Subcommittee on CriminalLaw of the Senate
Judiciary, 97th Congress, 1st Session 329, 793-974 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings], particularly the following testimony of Professor W.

LaFave:
To apply the exclusionary rule when an individual officer oversteps his
bounds but not when the violation of the fourth amendment is caused
by systemic defects, it seems to me, would be to turn the fourth amendment on its head.
Justice Stevens noted this point in his concurring opinion in Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. at 221:
The justification for the exclusion of evidence obtained by improper
methods is to motivate the law enforcement profession as a whole not the aberrant individual officer - to adopt and enforce regular procedures that will avoid the future invasion of the citizen's constitutional
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The respondents then turned to the heart of the good-faith
argument-were the costs of the exclusionary rule greater than
its benefits? Empirical studies were cited to the contrary-most
motions to suppress were found to be in nonviolent, possessory
crimes, i.e., drugs, gambling, pornography. 173 For example, one
study of the impact of the exclusionary rule in federal prosecutions indicated evidence was excluded in only 1.3% of 2,804 prosecutions, only half of which resulted in dismissals, mostly of
drug prosecutions. 174 This portion of the respondent's brief conrights. For that reason, exclusionary rules should embody objective criteria rather than subjective considerations.
See also Justice Harlan's insightful opinion in Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S.
560 (1971). In Whiteley, this Court flatly rejected the idea that the good
faith-reasonable belief of the arresting officer at the end of a chain of police
information was relevant when police at the earlier stages in the chain had
acted unlawfully and without probable cause. The Respondents argued
that the same analysis should apply to warrants that were obtained on less
than probable cause. It is irrelevant whether the officer executing a warrant acts with good faith if the officer who applied for it acted without probable cause. Respondents' Brief on Reargument at 47-48, Illinois v. Gates, 103
S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
173. Early studies seeking to assess the impact of the exclusionary rule
found that the large bulk of motions to suppress evidence were concen-

trated in narcotics, weapons and gambling cases, and that there was a negligible level of successful motions to suppress in serious, violent crime. For
example, Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 686-87 (1970), reports 1965 data for Washington, D.C.,
showing that successful motions to suppress were made in only 1% of all
other felonies.
More recently, two major studies by the Institute for Law and Social
Research (INSLAW) have found that the exclusionary rule combined with
suppression due to violations of other due process rights, results in only
minimal levels of rejections of complaints by prosecutors or dismissals by
courts. M. FORST, WHAT HAPPENS AFrER ARREST, 67-68 (1977), reports that
in the District of Columbia less than 1% of all potential prosecutions were
rejected by prosecutors and less than 2% of all prosecutions were dismissed
by courts based on all due process violations, including illegal searches. A
later multi-city study, Kathleen Brosi, A Cross-City Comparison of Felony
Case Processing (1979), examined felony cases in four cities and concluded
that the exclusionary rule has "little impact on the overall flow of criminal
cases after arrest." She found that rejections by prosecutors in potential
victimless crime categories for due process reasons, including illegal
searches, ranged from only 2% to 4% in three cities and reached 9% in one.
Id. at 16, Table 2.
174. This study was conducted by the Comptroller General of the United
States, Rep. No. GGD-79-45, Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal
CriminalProsecutions 11, 13, 14 (1979). Only 0.4% of cases studies declined
by prosecutors were rejected because of illegally seized evidence. Of
520,993 felony complaints referred to California district attorneys, only 0.8%
were rejected on fourth amendment grounds. National Institute of Justice,
The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in California (Dec. 1982)
[hereinafter NIJ Report].
The Bureau of Criminal Statistics data also shows that no murder prosecutions and only 0.096% of forcible rape prosecutions, 0.057% of robbery
prosecutions, and 0.131% of assault prosecutions were rejected for illegal
searches. See Davies, Do CriminalDue Process PrinciplesMake a Differ-
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cluded with the respondents characterizing the costs of lost convictions not simply as the costs of the exclusionary rule, but
175
more fundamentally, the costs of police illegality:
The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him

free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own
laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of
176
its own existence.
As a corollary to the foregoing, the respondents claimed that
the limited costs of the rule were not disproportionate to the
value of the fourth amendment and the deterrent benefits of the
rule. 177 The respondents' final argument was that, if any modifience?, 1982 Am. F. RES. J. 247, 267. Comparison of the actual number of the
rejected prosecutions in each crime category reported by Davies with the
numbers in the NIJ Report, supra, at 12, Table 3, shows the same negligible
effect on violent crimes. See generally, Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule
an 'Illogical'or 'Unnatural'Interpretationof the Fourth Amendment, 62 Judicature 66 (1978). See also Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's
Defense, I CriminalJustice Ethics, 28.30 (1982); Wilson, The Evidence is In Can We Use It?, Washington Post, Oct. 21, 1981, at A-27, col. 2: "[Ilt would
be a mistake, I think, to argue that the rule has contributed materially to the
increase in crime. Very few prosecutions for the kinds of crime we most
fear - mugging, burglaries, robberies - involve searches that might be
challenged as unreasonable . ... "
175. Respondents' Brief on Reargument at 53, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317 (1983).
176. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
177. Respondents' Brief on Reargument at 54, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317 (1983). Professor Yale Kamisar was cited for the observation that:
At the same time some critics of the exclusionary rule are urging its
elimination or substantial modification on the ground, inter alia, that it
has had little if any effect on police behavior and little if any impact on
the amount of pre-Mapp illegality, other critics are calling for the rule's
repeal or revision on the ground, inter alia, that in recent years the police have attained such a high incidence of compliance with Fourth
Amendment requirements that 'the absolute sanctions of the Exclusionary Rule are no longer necessary to police them.' Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 72-73 (1978).
Respondents' Brief on Reargument at 54, n.24, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317 (1983). See also Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor'sDefense,
I CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETmIcs, 28.30 (1982); Senate Hearings, supra note 174 at
808 (testimony of Judge Herbert Stern); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in
an Imperfect World: On Drawing 'Bright Lines' and 'Good Faith',43 U.
P Tr. L. REV. 307, 343 (1982).
Also cited was Chief Justice Burger's warning regarding the deleterious
consequences of any overruling of the exclusionary rule:
In a sense, our legal system has become the captive of its own creation.
To overrule Weeks and Mapp, even assuming the Court was now prepared to take that step, could raise yet new problems. Obviously the
public interest would be poorly served if law enforcement officials were
suddently to gain the impression, however erroneous, that all constitu-

tional restraints on police had somehow been removed-that an open

season on 'criminals' had been declared. I am concerned lest some
such mistaken impression might be fostered by a flat overruling of the
suppression doctrine cases.

19841

Gates: Probable Cause Redefined?

cation to the exclusionary rule was adopted, it should be applied
prospectively. 178 Oral arguments on the second set of briefs
were heard in March of 1983, but it was not until June that the
United States Supreme Court handed down the decision.
United States Supreme Court
When the Court's decision in Gates 179 came down in June,
1983, those awaiting a resolution to the good faith debate were
somewhat disappointed when the Court expressly decided to
forego the issue entirely. 180 Instead, the Court adopted a less
restrictive test for determining the validity of affidavits for
search warrants based on informant's tips. The majority opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and O'Connor. 18 1 Justice
White wrote a separate concurring opinion. 18 2 Two separate dissents were filed - one by Justice Brennan, in which Justice
Marshall joined, and the second by Justice Stevens, in which
t 83
Justice Brennan joined.
As for the good-faith issue, the majority declined to consider
it on the ground that it was "not pressed or passed upon below"
in the Illinois courts and thus not within the purview of the
Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction. 184 The relevant statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1257(3), which derives from section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides that the Court has certiorari jurisdiction from final judgments of the highest state court when a
federal question is presented. 85 Section 25 of the Judiciary Act,
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 420-21 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Respondents submitted that precisely the same warning applied
to a "wholesale good faith" exception. Respondent's Brief on Reargument
at 59-60, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
178. Respondents' Brief on Reargument at 60-66, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.
Ct. 2317 (1983). See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 548-50 (1982);

United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
297 (1967).
179. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
180. Id. at 2321.
181. Id. at 2320.
182. Id. at 2326 (White, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 2360 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

184. Id. at 2321.
185. The relevant portion of the statute reads:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in
which a decision could be had may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
as follows... (3) By writ of certiorari ... where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution,

treaties or statutes of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1976). This provision is derived from the Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85.
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the Court noted, has been interpreted to mean that certiorari
jurisdiction does not exist unless the federal question was either
raised or decided in the state court. 186 Whether this rule was
187
prudential or jurisdictional was not decided.
In Gates, the relevant aspect of the "not pressed or passed
upon below" rule was to what extent the federal question must
have been raised or decided in the state court. Some cases involve a federal question which is only an "enlargement" of an
argument or so connected in substance with an issue raised below that the rule is satisfied. 88 The Court stated that although
the fourth amendment issue was argued at every level of the
state proceedings, "[tihe state never . ..raised or addressed
the question whether the federal exclusionary rule should be
modified in any respect, and none of the opinions of the Illinois
1 89
courts give any indication that the question was considered."
Accordingly, the Court refused to treat the good-faith exception
as a mere "enlargement" of the fourth amendment issue. The
Court also noted that, although this case involved the failure to
raise a defense to a federal right considered below, rather than
the failure of a proponent to assert a federal claim, the underlying justifications for the rule required that the same result be
obtained. 90 Lastly, because of the great significance of the goodfaith issue and the need for an adequate factual record, the
Court found even greater justification for a strict construction of
the "pressed or passed upon below" rule. 191
186. Crowell v. Randall, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368, 391 (1836). The rule is not so

strictly interpreted as to require that the federal claim be both raised and
decided below - either is sufficient. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
2321, n.1 (1983).
187. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2322. The jurisdictional character of the
"not pressed or passed upon" is found in Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 805806 (1971) and State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 160 (1945).
The rule was treated as prudential in nature in Vachon v. New Hampshire,
414 U.S. 478 (1974) and Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
188. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2322 (1983).
189. Id. The good faith exception was never subject to any "real contest"
below and was found to be a separate issue from the substantive fourth
amendment claim previously argued. Id. at 2323-24.
190. Id. at 2323. This was the first case before the Supreme Court in
which the rule was applied in such circumstances. There are three justifications put forth for the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule. First, it is
likely that, in a case where the rule applies, the record on the federal issue
will be inadequate. Second, the federal courts should defer to the state
courts to give them the opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the
state officials' actions. Finally, the rule gives state courts the chance to decide the case on an independent and adequate state ground. Id.
191. Id. at 2325: "The public importance of our decisions in Weeks and
Mapp and the emotions engendered by the [good faith] debate surrounding these decisions counsel that we meticulously observe our customary
procedural rules." The references to "prudential" and "procedural" in this
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Finally, the majority turned to the issue of "whether respondents' rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments were
violated by the search of their car and house."'1 92 The Court reviewed the facts 193 and agreed with the Illinois Supreme Court
that the anonymous letter itself could not provide a basis for the
magistrate's finding of probable cause. 19 The majority disagreed, however, with the method by which the Illinois Supreme
Court determined that police corroboration was also insufficient
the Aguilar and Spinelli test. The Court stated,
"[w]e agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant's
'veracity', 'reliability' and 'basis of knowledge' are all highly relevant - We do not agree, however, that these elements should be
understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to
be rigidly exacted in every case ... Rather, as detailed below, they
should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that
may usefully illuminate the common-sense, practical question
that contraband or eviwhether there is 'probable cause' to believe
195
dence is located in a particular place."'
In lieu of the two-pronged Aguilar test, the Court adopted a
"totality of the circumstances" approach. 196 The Court justified
the approach by stating that the standard for probable cause is a
"practical, nontechnical conception", 97 to be determined in
common sense terms as understood by law enforcement personnel, not by legal scholars. 198 Rigid legal rules are poorly suited
to test a fluid, diverse concept such as probable cause. 199 Further, instead of an independent consideration of veracity and basis of knowledge, the two prongs should be treated as "relevant
considerations" in determining probable cause, so that a deficiency in one prong may be cured by a strong showing in the
other.200 The Court also stated that, because affidavits are often
prepared by non-attorneys and warrants issued by lay persons,
the legal requirements for their sufficiency should not be overportion of the opinion indicate that, at least under the facts presented in
Gates, the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule is not jurisdictional. Id.
192. Id. at 2325.
193. The Court characterized the address supplied by the confidential informant at Mader's request as a "more recent address." Id. There is nothing in the record though to indicate it was any more than a different address
than that first given by the anonymous tipster.
194. Id. at 2326. The Court noted that neither the informant's reliability
or basis of knowledge was supplied in the letter. Id.
195. Id. at 2327-28.
196. Id. at 2328.
197. Id., quoting, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2329. The Court cited as an example that an informant may be
so well known for reliable tips that failure to specify his basis of knowledge
in one case should not be fatal. Id.
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technical. 20 1 In keeping with this elastic approach and in light of
the fourth amendment's preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant, review of a search warrant should not be de
novo. The Court reiterated that the reviewing court should only
determine whether the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for
20 2
believing that a search would reveal contraband.
The majority's final justification for abandoning the Aguilar
approach was of a practical nature- the strictures of such a
rigid standard might seriously impede the law enforcement process. 20 3 Anonymous tips would be of little help to police because most "ordinary citizens" do not satisfy the basis of
20 4
knowledge requirement and their veracity is often unknown.
Citing pre-Aguilar cases and apparently rejecting the respondents' contention that Aguilar was merely a refinement of,
rather than departure from, earlier law, 20 5 the Court went on to
discuss the boundaries of the "totality of the circumstances"6
20
standard which it characterizes as the "traditional" analysis.
Finally, the majority discussed the importance of police corroboration of an informant's tip in determining whether the "totality of the circumstances" amounts to probable cause. 20 7 The
majority cited Draper v. United States 20 8 as "the classic case on
the value of corroborative efforts of police officials" '20 9 and compared the facts of Draper to those in Gates. The Court concluded that "[tjhe showing of probable cause in the present
case was fully as compelling as that in Draper.' 210 The investigations of Detective Mader and the DEA suggested the Gates'
201. Id. at 2330.

202. Id. at 2331, citing, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960).
203. Id. at 2331-32.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2332. For this the Court cited United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102 (1965); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
206. Respondent's Brief at 7, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). The
majority's concept of what constitutes a "totality of the circumstances" is
somewhat unclear. More than a sworn statement of an afflant that "he has

cause to suspect and does believe" that contraband exists in a certain place
is required, see Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933), nor will an
affidavit such as that at issue in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), suffice.
Just what is enough, however, was not clarified: "But when we move beyond the 'bare bones' affidavits presented in cases such as Nathanson and
Aguilar, this area simply does not lend itself to a prescribed set of rules,
like that which had developed from Spinelli." Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 2332-33 (1983). The majority pointed out that Spinelli could very well
have been wrongly decided. Id. at 2332 n.11.
207. Id. at 2334-35.
208. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
209. 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2334 (1983).
210. Id. at 2334.
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involvement in drug trafficking. 21 1 The court also found that
other facts suggested a "pre-arranged drug run."2 12 In addition
to these circumstances, the majority found that the magistrate
also could have relied on the anonymous letter, corroborated "in
major part" by Detective Mader's investigative efforts. 213 As for
the lack of information regarding the tipster's reliability, the
Court concluded that this factor paled in significance after independent police investigations corroborated the letter's predictions.214 The Court further concluded that the letter's detail,
especially the "accurate information" regarding the Gates'
travel plans, indicated that the letter was reliable. 215 The majority acknowledged that the letter also failed to meet the basis of
knowledge test but that police corroboration cured this defect as
well. 2 16 Furthermore, police corroboration created a "fair
probability" that the tipster got his information from a reliable
21 7
source.
In his concurring opinion, Justice White contended that the
good-faith exception was properly before the Court, and should
be applied in this case. 218 In his view, the good-faith issue was
embraced by the fourth amendment claim and therefore was
"pressed or passed upon below. ' 21 9 Like the exclusionary rule,
"the issues surrounding a proposed good faith modification are
intricately and inseverably tied to the nature of the fourth
211. Id. at 2334-35.
212. Id. The facts which the Court found to suggest a prearranged drug
run were Lance Gates's flight to Florida, his brief one-night motel stay and
return next day north to Chicago in a family car which was "conveniently"
awaiting him in West Palm Beach. Id. at 2334.
213. Id. at 2334-35.
214. Id. at 2335. The Court did note that the lack of reliability was significant at the time the letter was received by the Bloomingdale Police. The
corroboration cited included the presence of the Gates' car in Florida, the
fact that Lance Gates would be in Florida and would drive north toward
Bloomingdale. All these details indicated to the Court that the informant
was probably reliable. Id. In support, Justice White's concurring opinion
from Spinelli was quoted: "[b ecause an informant is right about some
things, he is more probably right about other facts." Id., citing, Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. at 427. The Gates Court's treatment of corroboration
of innocent details is discussed supra notes 168-174 and accompanying text.
215. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2335. Such information was significant

because it could only be obtained from the Gates' themselves or a close
associate. To call all of this "accurate" is disputable. The tipster was in

error when he or she stated that Susan Gates would fly home from Florida
when, in fact, she drove home with her husband. The majority noted this
inaccuracy, Id. at 2335-36 n.14, but found it relatively insignificant.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2336. Thus, contrary to Stanley v. State, a lack of facts in the
affidavit regarding the informant's basis of knowledge can be cured by police corroboration. Id. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.

218. Id. at 2336 (White, J., concurring).
219. Id. at 2337.
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amendment violation." 220 Justice White went on to consider the
propriety of a good faith exception and in a traditional "reason
for the rule" analysis, urged its adoption. 221 He concluded his
concurrence by analyzing the warrant under Aguilar and
his view, that the warrant was also valid
Spinelli and found, in
222
under this approach.
Justice Brennan dissented based on two grounds-that the
warrant was invalid even under the "totality of the circumstances" standard and that the Aguilar and Spinelli test should

be retained. 223 In support of the second ground, Justice Brennan reviewed the development of the use of hearsay to supply
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant stating that the relevant case law stood for a single proposition: "[F]indings of
probable cause, and attendant intrusions, should not be authorized unless there is some assurance that the information on
which they are based has been obtained in a reliable way by an
honest or credible person. '224 There is a need to structure this
inquiry and this need, the dissent argued, was fulfilled by the
two-prong test. 225 Justice Brennan pointed out that all but one

of the cases relied on by the majority were decided before Agui226
lar and that none of them was inconsistent with Aguilar.
Justice Brennan criticized the majority opinion for failing to
lend importance to the value of reliable, credible information as
a basis for probable cause.227 Justice Brennan expressed a fear,
shared by Justice White, that the rejection of Aguilar portends
220. Id. at 2338. Justice White characterized the majority's holding that a

magistrate have only a "substantial basis" for finding probable cause was
itself merely a "variation of the good faith theme." Id. Nor was he persuaded by the Court's rationale on this issue. Id.
221. Id. at 2340. Justice White's treatment of the good-faith issue is discussed in full, supra notes 219-220 and accompanying text, in connection
with three cases on review before the Supreme Court in the October 1983
term. It is likely at least one of these cases will finally dispose of this question. See United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
103 S.Ct. 3535 (1983); Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d
725 (1982), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 3534 (1983); People v. Quintero, - Colo.
- 657 P.2d 948 (1983), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 3535 (1983).
222. 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2350-51 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 2351-57 (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting.).
224. Id. at 2357-58.
225. Id. at 2358. The Aguilar-Spinelli test, Brennan claimed, served to
inform police and magistrates of the type of information they should demand in the warrant process. Also, it informed the magistrate of his proper
role in determining whether probable cause exists. This, therefore, will ensure the function of the magistrate as a neutral and detached arbiter of
probable cause. Id.
226. Id. at 2357. Brennan argued that the "practical, nontechnical" concept of probable cause advanced by the majority was indeed advanced by
the two-prong test. Id. at 2359.
227. Id.
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an erosion of the probable cause standard. 228
The second dissent, by Justice Stevens, asserted that, as to
the search of the car, the majority should have vacated the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Ross. 229 Justice Stevens also argued

230
Of
that the search of the house was without probable cause.
particular importance to Justice Stevens was the informant's
misdescription of Susan Gates' travel plans. 231 Justice Stevens
interpreted this discrepancy as casting doubt on the letter as a

whole.

232

THE EFFECT OF GATES ON FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

The fourth amendment guarantees individuals the right to
be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures ... and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause. '233 The essential protection of
the warrant requirement is that probable cause to issue a warrant must be determined by a neutral and detached magistrate 23 and not by law enforcement personnel "engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. '235 To ensure the independence of the magistrate and the constitutional
228. Id. The dissent concluded with this dire prediction:
By replacing Aguilar and Spinelli with a test that provides no assurance that magistrates, rather than the police, or informants, will make
determinations of probable cause; imposes no structure on magistrates'
probable cause inquiries; and invites the possibility that intrusions may
be justified on less than reliable information from an honest or credible
person, today's decision threatens to "obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are
under the law, and the police-state where they are the law.
Id. (citation omitted).
229. Id. at 2361-62. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 2361.
231. Id. at 2360-61. This "material" discrepancy was determined to be important for three reasons: (1) it cast doubt on the prediction regarding the
amount of drugs in the Gates' home; (2) it made the Gates' conduct appear
less unusual; and (3) it made the letter itself less reliable. Justice Stevens'
dissent noted that the critical time for determining the existence of prob-

able cause was upon the issuance of the warrant, so that the fact that the
Gates' drove all night and had marijuana in their car was irrelevant. Id. at
2361 n.6.
232. Id. at 2360.
233. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment rights have been
characterized as belonging "in the catalog of indispensable freedoms ....
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
234. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2351-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
235. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1947).
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mandate of probable cause, the courts developed the requirement that magistrates be provided with the underlying facts and
circumstances that support the officer's conclusions that criminal activity is afoot. 23 6 Pursuant to this requirement, the body of

law relating to hearsay affidavits for search warrants developed.
When an officer provided the magistrate with objective data establishing a hearsay informant as credible and his information
as reliable, the magistrate himself was able to determine
whether probable cause exists. 237 This determination did not
depend on the mere conclusion of an overly zealous police officer or his informant, whose motivation may also be
238
questionable.
One must examine the Supreme Court's holding in Gates
with the foregoing concerns in mind because the Court's abandonment of Aguilar and Spinelli cannot constitutionally be read
as an abandonment of the requirement of a neutral, detached,
and independent magistrate. The majority agreed with the Illinois courts that the letter itself failed to establish probable
cause. 239 It was the investigative efforts of the police that
brought the affidavit up to constitutional standards. 240 The
Court stated that Draper was the benchmark by which the
Court measured the value of the police investigation and it conin ... [Gates] was
cluded that "the showing of probable cause
'24 1
fully as compelling as that in Draper.
236. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2352 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
237. See, e.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
238. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113-15 (1964).
239. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2326 (1983). The Court concluded
"[t] he letter provides virtually nothing from which one might conclude that
its author is either honest or his information reliable; likewise, the letter
gives absolutely no indication of the basis for the writer's predictions regarding the Gates' criminal activities." Id.
240. Id. at 2334. The corroboration alone, the Court noted, "at least suggested that the Gates were involved in drug trafficking," noting that Florida
was a well-known source of drugs and Lance Gates's travel plans which
were "as suggestive of a prearranged drug run, as ... of an ordinary vacation trip." Id.
241. Id. According to the majority, the Drapertip might not have met the
two-pronged test. Id. at n.12. Courts have struggled with reconciling
Draperwith Spinelli because in Draperthe tip did not indicate the informant's basis of knowledge, although the informant was established as reliable. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 309 (1959). Further, portions of
the Spinelli opinion indicated that police must corroborate activity that
suggests illegal, rather than merely innocent, conduct. Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 418 (1969). Nevertheless, the detail of the tip in Draper,
was interpreted in Spinelli to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong. Id. at
417 (detail enabled magistrate to infer that "the informant had gained his
information in a reliable way") One commentator suggested that Draper
and Spinelli could be reconciled by adopting a three-part analysis which
recognizes the following: (1) Tips from confidential informants are presumptively more reliable than those from anonymous tipsters; (2) Specific
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The Court's reliance on Draper is subject to substantial criticism. The majority refused to distinguish Draper on the ground
that the Draper informant 242 had been a special employee of the
Bureau of Narcotics, had given reliable information on several
occasions in the past,243 and was therefore unquestionably reliable. The Gates Court also failed to recognize that the tip in
Draper was far more specific than the anonymous letter in
Gates.24
The Draper informant supplied a highly detailed
description of the suspect, including his dress and style of walking.245 The detail in the Draper tip, Justice Harlan wrote in
Spinelli, satisfied the basis of knowledge requirement because
it enabled the magistrate to infer that "the informant had gained
his information in a reliable way. ''246 Conversely, the Gates letter was far more general and failed to supply even an address or
247
physical description of the suspects.
Draper differs from Gates in the extent of police corroboration as well. In Draper,every detail of the tip was corroborated
by police investigation except the ultimate fact - whether the
suspect possessed heroin. 248 In Gates, the independent investigation turned up two conflicting addresses 249 and revealed that
250
the tipster inaccurately described Susan Gates' travel plans.
In fact, the police, in Gates, did not even verify that Susan was
the woman who left West Palm Beach with Lance Gates on May
tips show a more reliable basis of knowledge than general tips; and (3) Corroboration of incriminating details indicates greater reliability than corroboration of innocent details. Anonymous Tips, supra note 83, at 122-25. Thus,
because the Draper tip was so highly detailed, the police needed to verify
only innocent details while the sparse tip in Spinelli required corroboration
of incriminating facts. Id. at 124.
242. 103 S. Ct. at 2335. The Court recognized this distinction but found
that it paled in significance after the police investigation had occurred.
Therefore, under Gates, as under Spineili v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 427

(White, J., concurring), corroboration may still cure a defect in veracity.
See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2335.
243. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 309 (1959).
244. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2334-35. The "details" were given added
force when the Court characterized them as of a type likely to be obtained
only from the Gates themselves or a close associate. Id. at 2335.
245. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
246. 393 U.S. at 417. Interestingly, the Spinelli Court expressly rejected a

"totality of circumstances" approach. Id. at 415.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
248. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959). Because every
other detail was verified, the police had "'reasonable grounds' to believe
that the remaining unverified bit of Hereford's information - that Draper
would have the heroin with him - was likewise true." Id.
249. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
250. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2335. The majority refused to characterize this as a material mistake. Id. at 2335 n.14. Justice Stevens, in his
dissent, found this discrepancy very important. Id. at 2360 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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6; nor did they know how long she was in Florida or how she
travelled there. 25 ' There was no corroboration of the statement
that the Gates' car was "loaded up with drugs" or that their car
contained any contraband on the return trip. Of course, the
fruits of the search cannot be considered as verification of the
tip. 252 Unlike the Draper tip, many of the statements in the
Gates letter were mere conclusions, rather than specific details
capable of verification, i.e., that the Gates' "strictly make their
living on selling drugs" and "brag about the fact they never have
'25 3
to work, and make their entire living on pushers.
Perhaps more significant is that the Gates court refused to
view an anonymous tipster as any less reliable than a confidential informant. One commentator has suggested that anonymous informants be presumed inherently unreliable because
their motives are open to question. 254 After the Court's decision
in Gates, an anonymous tipster is subject to the same test as
one who has provided reliable information on many previous occasions. This result seems to fly in the face of the Court's purportedly "common sense approach". Legal commentators have
cautioned against the potential dangers of using anonymous tips
as a basis for a search. 255 Such tips, which may merely be an
offhand remark, invite abuse by overzealous police in investigating crime and obtaining warrants. Anonymous tips are "frequently mere boasts of hypothetical illegal activities that are
25 6
It
never performed, but are fabricated to impress listeners."
has been recommended that in cases such as Gates, where the
251. See supra text at 208-218 discussing police corroboration in Gates.
252. An inadequate showing of probable cause may not be cured by postsearch evidence. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450-51 (1971).
Yet Justice Stevens accused the majority of being influenced by the fruits
of the search in Gates. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2361 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
253. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2325. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
254. Anonymous Tips, supra note 83, at 125.
255. Id. at 106-07:
A tip from an anonymous informant is presumptively unreliable because the police and the magistrate cannot know the motives of the
anonymous informant - he may be motivated by a sense of civic duty,
revenge, or a desire to eliminate criminal competition. The police and
the magistrate do not know if the informant is supplying information
against his penal interest or has previously provided any, must less accurate, information to the police. The motives of anonymous informants may include harassment of a neighbor or a racial minority. In
addition, the police and the magistrate cannot possible know how the
informant obtained the information, nor can they obtain additional information from him or her. Thus, tips from anonymous informants are
presumptively unreliable unless overcome by external considerations.
Id. Justice Stevens's dissent agreed with this approach. 103 S.Ct. at 2361.
256. Anonymous Tips, supra note 83, at 121-22.

19841

Gates: Probable Cause Redefined?

tip was both anonymous and sparsely detailed, the courts
should require that police corroborate incriminating details in
25 7
order to establish probable cause.
The long-range effects of the Gates "totality of circumstances" approach can, of course, only be hypothesized. It is
likely, however, that the role of the neutral and detached magistrate will be curtailed. 25 8 When the tipster's veracity and basis
of knowledge are not set forth in the affidavit, the magistrate will
be forced to rely on the conclusions of the police officer/affiant
as to the value of the tip. Thus, the decision to search is left to
law enforcement personnel, rather than to the magistrate, and
the essential protection of the warrant clause is nullified. We
can expect more searches, based on less reliable evidence, simply because the Gates standard is more lenient than that required under former law.
The long-range effect on the law of probable cause also merits some concern. The deference accorded the magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant, 25 9 coupled with judicial
preference for searches based on a warrant, 260 renders the constitutional basis for questionable searches difficult to question
on review. Even assuming that the police will attempt to comply
with the law of probable cause, the vagaries inherent in the "totality of the circumstances" approach will frustrate their efforts.
The magistrate will also suffer from the lack of a well-defined
standard. Precedent will be of little assistance because of the
elastic nature of the new standard. It may be predicted that the
resultant body of case law in the probable cause area will be a
hodge-podge, overly dependent on the facts of each case, and of
little assistance to the police, magistrates, and reviewing courts
26 1
in making probable cause determinations in the future.
There is no question that the "totality of circumstances"
analysis encompasses a substantially more lenient approach to
the law of probable cause. The question remains whether state
courts will adopt the Gates analysis or choose instead to remain
faithful to the principles of Aguilar and Spinelli.
257. Id. at 124-25.
258. This concern was voiced by Justice Brennan in his dissent, Illinois v.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2359, but the majority reasoned that the magistrate
would remain free to exact whatever assurances were found necessary in
making probable cause determinations. Id. at 2332.
259. The task of a reviewing court is simply to determine whether the
magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . .conclud[ing]" that probable
cause existed. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960).
260. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2331.
261. Justice Brennan's dissent was based largely on this concern. Illinois
v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2355.
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It is a well-accepted principle of state sovereignty that a
state court has the power to require higher standards for
searches and seizures than those required by the Federal Constitution. 262 The classic case on this point is South Dakota v.
Opperman.263 At issue in Opperman was the admissibility of
evidence seized pursuant to an inventory search. 264 The South
Dakota Supreme Court held that the search was unreasonable, 265 but the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with
its opinion. 266 The South Dakota Supreme Court, on rehearing,
the search and
then found that the inventory search violated
267
seizure prcvision of the state constitution.
In support of its holding, the court stated:
There can be no doubt that this court has the power to provide an
individual with greater protection under the state constitution than
does the United States Supreme Court under the federal constitution. [citation omitted]. This court is the final authority on interpretation and enforcement of the South Dakota Constitution. We
have always assumed the independent nature of our state constitution regardless of any similarity between the language of that document and the federal constitution. Admittedly the language of
Article VI, § 11 is almost identical to that found in the Fourth
Amendment; however, we have the right to construe our state constitutional provision in accordance with what we conceive to be its
plain meaning. We find that logic and a sound regard for the purposes of the protection afforded by S.D. Const., Art. VI § 11 warrant
a higher standard of protection for the individual in this instance
Supreme Court found necessary under the
that the United States
268
Fourth Amendment.
262. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968); Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). Cf. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719-20 (1975) (state
court decided case on federal constitutional grounds so that defendant's
claim of a stricter state constitutional provision regarding compulsory selfincrimination was rejected). See also People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 10, 545
P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rtpr. 360 (1976); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531
P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51
(1974); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied 417 U.S. 969 (1974); State v.
Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973). More recently, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the rules of "standing" in search and seizure cases
are less stringent in Alaska courts than in the federal system. Waring v.
State, 34 Crim. L. Rep. 1002, Oct. 5, 1983).
263. 428 U.S. 364, on remand, State v. Opperman, 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D.
1975).
264. 247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976).
265. 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1975).
266. 428 U.S. at 364.
267. 247N.W.2d at 674.
268. Id. at 674-75 (footnotes omitted). Recently, one commentator noted
that states are increasingly using their own constitutions in their area of
individual rights. Ronald K. L. Collins, State ConstitutionalLaw, Important
PrecedentsEmerging as States Use Their Constitutions,The Nat. L. J., Mon-
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Consequently, the Illinois courts are free to retain the two-pronged test of Aguilar and Spinelli or they may choose instead the
"totality of circumstances" approach advanced by the United
States Supreme Court. The defendants informally requested a
hearing before the Illinois Supreme Court on this point,269 but
this request was denied and the case was directed to the trial
court. As of this writing, the defendants are expected to urge
the trial court to reject the "totality of circumstances" analysis.
Thus far, the Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted the llinois Constitutions' search and seizure provision to accord with
the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis. 270 As discussed earlier, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule, based on the
Illinois Constitution, prior to Mapp v. Ohio,271 in which the
2 72
United States Supreme Court applied the rule to the states,
and even before the fourth amendment itself was applied to the
states via the fourteenth amendment. 273 Illinois courts continue
to cite the state constitution in suppressing illegally seized evidence, 274 as well as a state statute which codifies the exclusionary rule. 2 75 In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court cited the state
constitution in holding that the search in Gates was
276
unconstitutional.
day, Sept. 19, 1983, p.25 -2 8 . In the criminal area, the author cited In re Reed,
33 Cal. 3d 914, 603 P.2d 216,,191 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983) (state cruel and unusual
punishment clause); Attorney General v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 444 N.E.2d

915 (1982) (state prohibition against self-incrimination requires transactional immunity though fifth amendment requires only derivative use
type); State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983) (state court rejected
federal double jeopardy rule); State v. Bowry, 295 Or. 337, 667 P.2d 996
(1983) (search and seizure); State v. Freeland, 295 Or. 367, 667 P.2d 509
(1983) (privileges and immunities in context of prosecutor's decision to initiate criminal cases by indictment or information); State v. Zegeer, 296 S.E.2d
873, (W.Va.), on rehearing 296 S.E.2d 881 (W. Va. 1982) (state constitutional
provisions against cruel and unusual punishment).
269. Letter from James W. Reilley, attorney for Lance and Susan Gates
dated July 1, 1983.
2d 42, 245 N.E.2d 487 (1969).
270. See, e.g., People v. Parker, 42 Ill.
271. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
272. People v. Brocamp, 307 111. 448, 138 N.E.728 (1923). See also, People v.
392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924).
Castree, 311 Ill.
273. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
2d 572, 182 N.E.2d 662 (1962):
274. See, e.g., People v. Parren, 24 Ill.
"Under neither [Article II, § 6 of the Illinois Constitution nor the federal
fourth amendment] may a conviction stand when it is based upon evidence
that is the product of an unreasonable search and seizure." Id. at 575, 182
N.E.2d at 664.
275. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12 (1976).
276. People v. Gates, 85 IM. 2d 376, 381-82, 423 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1981). The
court stated that "[b Ioth the Constitution of the United States ... and the
Constitution

of Illinois

... provide

assurance against

unreasonable

searches and seizures of person and property." Id. The defendants argued
that this constituted an independent and adequate state ground for the Illinois Supreme Court's decision. See supra notes 161-166 and accompanying
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Since Gates was decided, the Illinois Supreme Court has
had the opportunity to accept or reject the "totality of circumstances" approach, but has managed to sidestep the issue. In
People v. Winters,277 decided in the May, 1983 term, the court
found a search proper under both Aguilar and Gates. The court
first applied Aguilar's two-pronged test to the facts and found
both the basis of knowledge and veracity requirements satisfied.2 7 8 The court also cited Illinois v. Gates, noting that "strict
adherence to the Aguilar-Spinelli test has been abandoned,"
but found under either approach probable cause existed. 279 Nowhere did the court expressly adopt Gates in lieu of the AguilarSpinelli approach.
A similar analysis was used in People v. Exline,28 0 decided
text. Accordingly, the very least the United States Supreme Court should
have done was to remand the case to the Illinois Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the decision on the federal issue. See, e.g., California v.
Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972) (case remanded to determine whether state court
decision rested on adequate and independent state ground). Instead, the
Supreme Court simply reversed and the Illinois Supreme Court then remanded to the trial court. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2336.
277. 97 111. 2d 151, 454 N.E.2d 299 (1983). In Winters, a police officer
learned from a "telephone informant" that three named persons were responsible for Fotomat robberies. The informant was known to be reliable
but said he got his information from an unidentified third person, whose
reliability the officer could not attest to. The informant said the robbers
lived in Lisle, Illinois, and drove a 1975 maroon-over-white Pontiac. This
vehicle was linked to one of the named parties. The police watched the car
and followed as two persons drive it to a Fotomat. One of the passengers
got out of the car, pulled a knit cap over his face, and knocked on the Fotomat window. The employee refused to respond and the Pontiac left the
scene. The police followed it to a restaurant, and soon after the man was
seen running from the restaurant. Shortly thereafter, the restaurant reported a robbery. The police lost sight of the Pontiac but found it later at
the apartment complex which had been the original point of surveillance.
The police stood outside the door of one of the apartments and heard voices
"discussing splitting up money and saving enough money for bond." Id. at
154-56, 454 N.E.2d at 301-02. A warrantless search of the apartment revealed
a money bag. It was the legality of this entry that was at issue. Id. at 159,
459 N.E.2d at 303. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the State that,
when the Pontiac was found at the apartment complex, the police had probable cause to believe the suspects were in the apartment. Id.
278. At this juncture, the court stated:
The specificity of detail as to the activities that the occupants of the
maroon-over-white Pontiac did engage in on the evening of January 4,
1979, satisfied the 'basis of knowledge prong,' while the course of events
on January 4, 1979, showing that the informant's tip was reliable satisfied the 'veracity prong'....
Id. at 160-161, 454 N.E.2d at 344. The court also cited the "substantial" independent police corroboration as satisfying both prongs of Aguilar. Id. at
161, 454 N.E.2d at 304.
279. Id. The entry was found reasonable because of exigent circumstances: the police were in pursuit of an armed suspect and faced a "genuine emergency." Id. (citing People v. Abney, 81 Ill. 2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 543
(1980)).
280. 98 Ill.
2d 150, 456 N.E.2d 112 (1983).
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in October, 1983. In Exline, a search warrant was issued authorizing the search of the apartment of Jeff Smith for cannabis and
drug-related paraphernalia. 28 1 The warrant was supported by
the affidavit of a Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad agent. The
agent stated that a confidential informant could buy cannabis
from Smith, had done so in the past, and that Smith lived at
apartment number 110 at 1860 B. Aycliff Court, in Joliet, Illinois. 2 8 2 The agent arranged three controlled purchases using
his informant and during the subsequent search of the apart283
ment the defendant, who resided with Smith, was present.
284
She was arrested and charged with prior related offenses.
The Illinois Supreme Court expressly refrained from deciding whether Gates should be applied prospectively or retroactively, because "under either approach [Gates or AguilarSpinelli], the affidavit contained sufficient information to sustain a determination of probable cause. ' 285 The court initially
performed a traditional Aguilar-Spinelli analysis, the precise issue being whether the police had probable cause to believe the
2 86
informant bought the cannabis at the defendant's apartment.
The court cited Spinelli and Brinegar for the proposition that
the question of probable cause was one of a non-technical, common sense nature and found that probable cause existed in the
Exline case. 2 87 After discussing the facts, the court concluded:
[W]e hold that the informant's credibility was sufficiently established, and the warrant was therefore not obtained in violation of
Aguilar and Spinelli. It follows that the affidavit complied with the
less rigid standard288
for determining probable cause set forth in Illinois v. Gates....
After discussing the "totality of the circumstances" test, the Exline court concluded that there existed a "fair probability" that
narcotics would be found in Smith's apartment, with special emphasis on the reliability provided by the three controlled
281. Id. at 152, 456 N.E.2d at 113.
282. Id., 456 N.E.2d at 113-14. The telephone directory listed Smith at this
address. Id. at 152-53, 456 N.E.2d at 114.
283. Id. at 153, 456 N.E.2d at 114.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 153-54, 456 N.E.2d at 114. The police never actually observed
the informant enter Smith's apartment which was located in an apartment
complex. Id.
287. Id. at 154-55, 456 N.E.2d at 114-115. The court noted that the affiantagent had personal knowledge of all the facts in the affidavit except whether
Smith was the actual perpetrator. Also, police corroboration of some details
provided by the tipster lent credence to those unconfirmed details. This
corroboration could also satisfy the veracity prong in cases where the informant cooperated closely with police.
288. Id. at 155, 456 N.E.2d at 115.
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purchases. 28 9 Justice Goldenhersh's dissent, in Exline, was
based in part, on his belief that the Illinois courts were not re290
quired to follow the Gates decision.
CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v.
Gates is subject to substantial criticism, especially with regard
to the Court's reliance on Draper as controlling law.29 1 The new
"totality of the circumstances" test with its inherent vagaries
promises at the very least to confuse the lower courts, 292 magistrates, and law enforcement personnel. Most disturbing is the
potential for police abuse of fourth amendment rights in the future, because the Gates approach is both unclear and less demanding than the abandoned Aguilar-Spinelli standard. 293 The
future of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
289. Id. at 155-56, 456 N.E.2d at 115. Justice Goldenhersh dissented on the
ground that there was insufficient evidence of the informant's reliability to
support a search of that particular apartment. Id. at 156-57, 456 N.E.2d at
116 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting). The dissent also criticized the majority
for "blindly" following the United States Supreme Court in Gates although
the Illinois Supreme Court had previously decided Gates on the basis of the
federal and state constitutions. Id. See also United States v. Kolodziej, 706
F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1983) held even under relaxed Gates standard, warrant
based on affidavit which failed to include informant's basis of knowledge or
strong showing of reliability could not be upheld).
290. See supra note 289.
291. Recently, Justice Rehnquist, in a speech before the Washington
Trial Lawyer's Conference, sought to explain the Court's decision in Gates,
stating that the dispute "was a classic case of one side having the facts,
[presumably the State], and the other side having the law [the defense]."
Justice Rehnquist said that during oral argument the State's lawyer
"stressed over and over again the facts ... and played down the importance of the two Supreme Court decisions," while the Gates' attorney "emphasized very heavily the legal ramifications of these decisions, and played
down the facts." He further noted that "I think it can fairly be said that
each of the two times the Justices of our Court came off the bench after
hearing the case argued, a majority of us felt that the facts simply 'reeked'
of probable cause." Justice Rehnquist added that it was the Justices' view
"that if there were previous decisions of our court that would have prevented a finding of probable cause in this case, it was very likely those decisions were incorrect." 129 Cm. DAILY. L. BuLL. 209, Oct. 18, 1983, at 1, 18. By
these statements, one is reminded of the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens, in which he stated: "I must surmise that the Court's evaluation of the
warrant's validity has been colored by subsequent events."' Illinois v.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2361 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
292. The analysis engaged in by the Illinois Supreme Court in Winters
and Exline, discussed supra, notes 277-290 and accompanying text, utilizing
both a traditional Aguilar approach and citing the new Gates approach, is
indicative of the confusion likely to result from Gates.
293. Judge Moylan of the Maryland Court of Appeals and author of the
oft-cited Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 313 A.2d 847 (1974), dismissed the
totality of circumstances test as a "flight from analysis." Id. at 522, 313 A.2d
at 856. See also Moylan, supra note 31, at 741.
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awaits the proper vehicle for decision. 294 A recent survey indicates a growing trend in favor of such an exception, 295 although
296
there remains substantial opposition in the legal community.
Whatever the future status of the good-faith exception, the
lower federal courts will already have their hands full grappling
with the boundaries of the Gates standard. Whether the Illinois
courts choose to retain the Aguilar-Spinelli test, or follow the
federal courts, may very well be determined by the return of
297
People v. Gates to the Illinois courts.

294. This term, the United States Supreme Court will hear three cases
that present the opportunity to decide the good faith issue. United States v.
Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.) (decision not reported), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
3535 (1983); Colorado v. Quintero, -

Colo -, 657 P.2d 948, cert. granted, 103

S. Ct. 3535 (1983); Massachusetts v. Shepard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725
(1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983). Last June, the Oregon Supreme
Court declined to review a case involving a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under the state constitution despite the United States
Supreme Court having granted certiorari in the above-cited cases. State v.

Davis, 62 Or. App. 772, 662 P.2d 13, cert. denied, See also 5 NAT'L L.J. 45, July 18, 1983 at 3, 22.

Or. -, 688 P.2d 381 (1983).

295. A recent survey conducted for the American Bar Association Journal indicated that in 1982, 42% of the attorneys polled favored a good faith
exception. In 1983, that figure rose to 49%. 69 A.B.A.J. 1218-19 (1983).
296. For example, the Illinois State Bar Association has decided to file an
amicus curiae brief urging the United States Supreme Court to reject the
good faith exception in one of three cases cited supra note 295. Memo from
Joshua Sachs of the Illinois State Bar Association, Amics Curiae Subcommittee, dated Sept. 15, 1983, to James W. Reilley, Attorney for Lance and
Susan Gates.
297. The defense attorneys for Lance and Susan Gates ified pretrial motions in November 1983. The trial court has not yet ruled on these motions.
Telephone conversation with Ms. Christine Curran, April 2, 1984.

